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Abstract 
 
Ebola is a deadly epidemic and has already cost the lives of at least 
10,000 people in West Africa.  A vaccine has yet to be discovered and 
the focus remains on containing the spread of the virus.  Although its 
spread has come under control in recent months, the actions of 
international agencies has been criticized.  In this study, we present a 
choice-problem, associated with the handling of Ebola by Health 
Policymakers.  We combine actual demographic data with realistic cost 
data for a limited range of interventions intended to slow transmission of 
the disease, into a quantitative model.  The model facilitates trials of 
many combinations of interventions, in an effort to minimise the further 
spread of Ebola.  The model can be used both as a teaching tool, as 
well as a prototype decision-making tool for the agencies involved in 
fighting such outbreaks, with limited budgets. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Ebola virus was first identified in the Sudan in 1976, and has re-
manifested itself 16 other times between then and 2012, causing 1,579 
deaths and a 67% fatality rate (WHO, 2014).  In 2014, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared the epidemic to be a ³public health 
emeUJHQF\ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQFHUQ´ :+2 (EROD 5HVSRQVH 7HDP
2014).  Ebola is categorised as high-risk epidemic and the current 
outbreak is believed to have led to the deaths of at least 10,000 people 
by February 2015, mainly in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Centers 
2 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; WHO, 2015; UN 2015a and 
2015b).  The UN has initiated a five point strategy, XQGHUWKHWLWOH³*OREDO
(EROD 5HVSRQVH´ (UN, 2015a, op.cit.): (1) stop the outbreak from 
spreading further; (2) treat the infected; (3) ensure essential services; 
(4) preserve stability; and; (5) prevent further outbreaks.  The 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and 
UNICEF have also joined with the WHO to lead the implementation of 
the lines of actions associated with this five point strategy.  However, 
these agencies¶ abilities to act are constrained by tight budgets.  The UN 
estimates that the total effort from October 2014 to June 2015 will cost 
$2.27billion, of which only $1.4billion has been either spent, or pledged.  
Post-outbreak reconstruction will increase the likely total cost to over 
$4billion (UN, 2015b, op.cit.).  The problem is exacerbated by the 
remoteness of the affected regions and quality of the infrastructure, that 
combine to affect adversely, the strategic and operational decisions 
facing the Agencies.  Notwithstanding this, they have to justify the costs 
and benefits of their actions associated with the handling of this 
epidemic.  This paper demonstrates the complexity associated with 
analysing risk and decision making.  This is achieved by designing and 
presenting a risk model that exhibits an example of constrained choice 
that the policymakers face. 
 
 
2. The Risk Model 
 
In this context, we refer to risk as the risk of the virus continuing to 
spread both within each region, and into other, previously unaffected 
regions.  We score the risk of Ebola being transmitted to other victims in 
the regions of five West African countries: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Mali and the Ivory Coast, according to pre-selected risk-attracting 
attributes.  Some of these pertain to the whole country (e.g. GDP, Public 
Expenditures, Literacy/Death Rates and number of Ebola Treatments 
Centres (ETCs)).  Others pertain to the region itself (location to Capital 
City, population densities), according to data availability.  Each 
component yields a score, emanating from its own risk table and the 
µYDOXH¶ SRVVHVVHG E\ WKH region at that point in time.  The relative 
importance of each component is expressed through the absolute 
values of the scores.  For example, Table 1 summarises the scores 
awarded for locaWLRQ WR WKH QDWLRQ¶V Fapital city.  The sum of these 
attribute scores gives a total risk score, which is then mapped to a 
specific qualitative risk class.  For illustrative purposes, it is assumed 
that each region will exhibit one of four levels of risk, as indicated in 
Table 2. 
 
7KLVJLYHVWKHµRSHQLQJ¶ULVNSRVLWLRQIRUHDFKregion.  It is assumed that 
the Agencies have at their disposal, three risk-reducing interventions 
that can be offered to each region, within the confines of the available 
budget. 
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Table 2 Ebola Problem : Qualitative Risk Classes 
        Risk Category 
Threshold Risk 
Score 
1. Moderately Serious 0 
2. Serious 400 
3. Very Serious 750 
4. Extremely Serious 900 
 
From previous experience, these are believed to reduce risk scores with 
the possibility that their implementation may be able to move a region 
into a lower risk class.  These are: (1) New ETCs, each staffed with care 
workers and equipment, including a laboratory; (2) Burial and 
Sanitization teams WRVDIHO\GLVSRVHRIYLFWLPV¶UHPDLQVDQGWRGLVLQIHFW
their living spaces; (3) Public Education Programmes (PEPs), to 
educate citizens in how to detect the early signs of Ebola and take 
precautions to reduce the risk of acquiring, or transmitting it.  In this 
model, a region can be offered an ETC, whose effectiveness is 
determined by the number already there (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Impact on the Risk Score of the construction of another ETC 
# ETCs already 
in the Region 
% reduction 
# ETCs already 
in the Region 
% reduction 
0 25% 4 2% 
1 10% 5 1% 
2 8% 
6 0.5% 
3 5% 
A Burial and Sanitization 7HDP¶V HIIHFWLYHQHVV LV determined by the 
physical territory (in km2) it has to cover.  This territory is a function of 
the region¶Voverall size and the number of teams to be deployed there.  
Accordingly, the model calculates the average territory implied as it 
considers the number of teams to deploy, and thence the region¶V
component score, according to Table 4. 
 
Table 1 Ebola Risk : Location to Capital City Risk component 
Location Risk Score 
Adjacent 10 
Close 50 
Distant 100 
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Table 4 Impact on the Risk Score of the Burial and Sanitisation 
Team density 
Area (km2) 
per team 
% reduction in 
score  
Area (km2) per 
team 
% reduction 
in score  
10-99 25% 10000-99999 3% 
100-999 15% 
100000-plus 0% 
1000-9999 8% 
 
The Agencies responsible for Public Health have to decide on whether 
to offer any form of public health awareness programme in each region.  
If they do decide to, then there are two levels of programme available: 
µ/RZ¶ DQG µ+LJK¶ ZLWK GLIIHUHQW SHU-capita costs and effectiveness in 
reducing the region¶VWRWDOULVNVFRUH  µ/RZ¶UHGXFHVWKHUHJLRQ¶VVFRUH
E\µ+LJK¶E\.  Of course, these Interventions are not costless, 
and the budget available to the Agencies is, perforce, limited.  Different 
costs were assumed for each country, to take into account the different 
terrains, labour markets, etc in each one.  The absolute costs of the 
ETCs dwarf all the other interventions, though it should be borne in mind 
that they are either per-team or per-capita costs.  Nevertheless, the per-
dollar effectiveness of each Intervention is designed, deliberately, to be 
very different in order to provoke a debate to the extent to which 
µH[SHQVLYH¶Lnterventions can be ignored as part of the solution.  We use 
3DOLVDGH¶s Risk Optimizer program and Excel, to trial and cost, 
combinations of ETCs, Burial-Sanitization Teams and PEPs in each 
region.  A budget of $4billion was assumed, being broadly in line with 
WKH 81¶V FXUUHQW HVWLPDWH DV WR WKH WRWDO FRVW RI ILJKWLQJ Ebola.  
However, this is deliberately less than the total cost of giving each 
region an additional ETC, a large number of Teams and High-level 
PEPs, otherwise, there would be no decision problem.  When trialling 
each combination of interventions, the model computes the new risk 
score and corresponding risk class for each region.  If the percentage 
reduction is sufficient, a region will be moved into a lower Risk Class 
(Table 2).  The objective is to maximise the total number of changes 
across all 64 regions, subject to not exceeding the $4billion budget.  In 
order to reduce the search for the optimal solution, it was assumed that 
a region can: (1) receive, at most, one new ETC; (2) receive a maximum 
of 50 Burial & Sanitization teams, regardless of its physical area and/or 
population; (3) be considered for either a Low- or High-level PEP. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
The model was then run for 18 hours, on a Dell Optiplex 7020 PC, in 
which time it performed 13.21 million combinations of interventions. 1  
                                                          
1 The spreadsheet showing the detailed computation and simulation are available from the 
Corresponding Author, upon request. 
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The best combination found in the time allowed results in a total of 76 
Risk-class reductions, affecting 55 of the 64 regions.  Of those 55, two 
regions were moved down by three risk classes (the maximum 
possible); 17 by two and 36 by one.  The average cost of each risk class 
improvement is $54.5 million, though with a large standard deviation 
($67.7m).  Table 5 summarises the number and costs of ETCs, Burial 
and Sanitization Teams and PEPs to be deployed into the regions. 
 
Table 6 summarises the distribution of regions into the four risk classes 
before and after the Interventions.  Remembering that the assumed 
FRVWV ZHUH QRW DFWXDOO\ µUHDO¶ EXW µUHDOLVWLF¶ ZH FDQ VHH WKDW WKH 
expensive ETCs account for almost all the $3.8billion spent.  The 
apparent cost per person reached by the 23 ETCs is also considerably 
greater than both the Burial Teams and PEPs.  This may cast some 
doubt on the wisdom of devoting so much of the budget on the ETCs, a 
point that is used to provoke debate amongst the students.  Is it 
acceptable to spend so much money on high-profile interventions, such 
as ETCs when lower-cost solutions, migKWEHPRUHµGROODU-HIIHFWLYH¶" 
 
In assessing how good the Optimizer is in finding the optimal solution, 
we note that even after 18 hours run-time, $190million remains unspent.  
We might consider purchasing another ETC in Guinea, Mali or Sierra 
Leone, or thousands more Burial-Follow-up teams, and/or upgraded 
PEPs.  Any seven of the nine regions left in their original classes (all 
µ6HULRXV¶LQWKLVFDVHFRXOGEHPRYHGGRZQWRWKHµ0RGHUDWHO\6HULRXV¶
Table 5 Summary Results: all areas 
Interventions # 
Cost 
($m) 
People 
reached 
(m) 
Spend 
per 
person  
% of 
total  
ETCs to be built 23 $3,679 18.679 $196.96 96.6% 
Burial & 
Sanitization 
teams 
2,189 $1.58 48.444 $0.03 0.0% 
PEP 
24 (High) 
27 (Low) 
$129.59 36.337 $3.57 3.4% 
Total Spent $3,810.17m Total Unspent $189.83m 
Table 6 Risk Categories before- and after Interventions 
Risk Categories Before After 
Moderately Serious 0 25 
Serious 32 28 
Very Serious 2 11 
Extremely Serious 30 0 
6 
category if an extra ETC were committed.  However, these are all in 
countries where an ETC costs more than the unspent budget.  Manually 
adjusting the Burial Teams and PEPs does, of course, use up some of 
the unspent budget, though it was not possible to obtain any additional 
risk class changes.  However, the Optimizer does suggest committing 
RYHUPLOOLRQRQILYHRIWKHQLQHµQR-FKDQJH¶regions.  This money could 
be added back into the unspent portion and the resulting $199million 
used to try and find further improvements.  It may be that the Optimizer 
just had not got around to doing that when the time permitted to find a 
solution, had elapsed. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
It is claimed that the probabilities of spreading Ebola across other parts 
of the world and the size of the associated impact are totally unknown 
and unpredictable. Moreover, no effective cure has yet been discovered 
to treat the Ebola infected patients successfully.  Consequently, the 
mitigation of risks associated with spreading Ebola is the only way to 
manage this emerging risk.  In this paper, we have offered a practical 
approach to the choice problem associated with the handling of the 
Ebola virus by health policy makers.  This practical exercise of mitigating 
the risk of spreading Ebola may contribute to the policy development 
DQG LPSOLFDWLRQV¶ LVVXHV ERWK D SXEOLF DQG SULYDWH OHYHOV HJ +HDOWK
Insurers).  In addition, the exercise can be used in teaching resource-
constrained optimisation approaches to Risk Students. 
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